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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Section 1513 of the Pennsylvania Race Horse 
Development and Gaming Act1 prevents appellees Pasquale T. 
Deon, Sr. (“Deon”) and Maggie Hardy Magerko (“Hardy”) 
from making any political contributions because they hold 
interests in businesses that have gaming licenses.  They sued 
 
1 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1101 et seq. (2010). 
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the Gaming Board2 and the Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
(collectively “the Commonwealth”) claiming First 
Amendment and Equal Protection violations.  The District 
Court concluded “that Section 1513 of the Gaming Act furthers 
a substantially important state interest” in preventing quid pro 
quo corruption.3  But it ruled that the restriction it imposes on 
political contributions is unconstitutional because the 
Commonwealth did not draw it closely enough.  It granted 
summary judgment in favor of Deon and Hardy, permanently 
enjoining enforcement of this section of the Act.4 
 
2 Deon and Hardy sued Appellants in their official capacities.  
Appellant David M. Barasch, Richard G. Jewell, Sean Logan, 
Kathy M. Manderino, Merritt C. Reitzel, Obra S. Kernodle, IV 
and Dante Santoni Jr. are members of the Gaming Board.  
Appellant Kevin F. O’Toole is the Executive Director of the 
Board. Appellant Paul Mauro is the Director of the Board’s 
Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement. Appellant Cyrus 
Pitre is the Director of the Board’s Office of Enforcement 
Counsel. Appellant Josh Shapiro is the Attorney General of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The appellants are charged 
with enforcing Section 1513 of the Gaming Act. See 4 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. §§ 1202, 1517(a.1), 1517(a.2), 1517(c.1). 
3 Deon v. Barasch, 341 F. Supp. 3d 438, 454 (M.D. Pa. 2018).  
But, referencing Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t. PAC, 528 
U.S. 377 (2000), it recognized that “there may be cause for 
some increased scrutiny of the legislature’s determination,” 
and concluded that the Commonwealth “failed to show a 
heightened justification for political contribution restrictions 
analogous to the government contracting and lobbying 
industries.”  Id. at 443-44. 
4 Id. at 454.  We must also pause here to note and complement 




The Commonwealth says the District Court erred 
because Section 1513 is a critical element of a robust effort to 
prevent well-documented corruption in the gaming industry 
from taking root in Pennsylvania.  They contend that the 
District Court’s order will make it impossible to take proactive 
steps to protect against a known threat to its  integrity. 
 
It is axiomatic that a democratic government must make 
every effort to fight corruption, and the perception of it, to 
protect the integrity of its electoral, legislative, and regulatory 
processes.  But when it acts it must be mindful of the 
fundamental speech and associational rights guaranteed by the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution at stake.5  
We conclude that the District Court did not err and we will 




The Contribution Restriction.  In 2004, the Gaming Act 
legalized casinos and racehorse tracks in Pennsylvania.  It also 
established the Gaming Control Board, tasking it with 
regulating the industry and issuing slot machine licenses.  
Section 1513 imposes a political contribution restriction. 
 
 
presented, and the scholarship with which she developed and 
applied the law. 




The following persons shall be 
prohibited from contributing any 
money or in-kind contribution to a 
candidate for nomination or 
election to any public office in this 
Commonwealth, or to any political 
party committee or other political 
committee in this Commonwealth 
or to any group, committee or 
association organized in support of 
a candidate, political party 
committee or other political 
committee in this Commonwealth: 
(1) An applicant for a slot machine 
license, manufacturer license, 
supplier license, principal license, 
key employee license, interactive 
gaming license or horse or harness 
racing license. (2) A slot machine 
licensee, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed supplier, interactive 
gaming operator or licensed racing 
entity. (3) A licensed principal or 
licensed key employee of a slot 
machine licensee, licensed 
manufacturer, licensed supplier, 
interactive gaming operator or 
licensed racing entity. (4) An 
affiliate, intermediary, subsidiary 
or holding company of a slot 
machine licensee, licensed 
manufacturer, licensed supplier, 
interactive gaming operator or 
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licensed racing entity. (5) A 
licensed principal or licensed key 
employee of an affiliate, 
intermediary, subsidiary or 
holding company of a slot machine 
licensee, licensed manufacturer, 
licensed supplier, interactive 
gaming operator or licensed racing 
entity. (6) A person who holds a 
similar gaming license in another 
jurisdiction and the affiliates, 
intermediaries, subsidiaries, 
holding companies, principals or 
key employees thereof.6 
 
The Commonwealth intended the political contribution 
restriction in Section 1513 (in the original language of the Act) 
to “prevent the actual or appearance of corruption that may 
result from large campaign contributions; ensure the bipartisan 
administration of this part; and avoid actions that may erode 
public confidence in the system of representative 
government.”7  But a casino owner sued and successfully 
argued that this restriction violated Free Speech rights 
guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution.8  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled:   
 
Here, we have found a wholesale 
banning of political contributions 
 
6 4 Pa. Con. Stat. § 1513 (2010). 
7 4 Pa. Con. Stat. § 1102 (2004). 
8 DePaul v. Commonwealth, 969 A.2d 536 (Pa. 2009); Pa. 
Const. art. 1, § 7. 
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to be impermissible when read in 
light of the legislative purpose of 
addressing the impact of large 
contributions on public confidence 
and trust.  In this context, it is 
apparent that the scope of the 
impermissible effects, i.e., the 
banning of small contributions 
and/or contributions unlikely to 
affect public confidence, is quite 
substantial.9  
  
So Pennsylvania lawmakers amended the Act to read as 
follows: 
 
The General Assembly has a 
compelling interest in protecting 
the integrity of both the electoral 
process and the legislative process 
by preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption which 
may arise through permitting any 
type of political campaign 
contributions by certain persons 
involved in the gaming industry 
and regulated under this part. 
Banning all types of political 
campaign contributions by certain 
persons subject to this part is 
necessary to prevent corruption 
and the appearance of corruption 
 
9 DePaul, 969 A.2d. at 553. 
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that may arise when political 
campaign contributions and 
gaming regulated under this part 
are intermingled.  It is necessary to 
maintain the integrity of the 
regulatory control and legislative 
oversight over the operation and 
play of slot machines, table games 
and interactive gaming in this 
Commonwealth; to ensure the 
bipartisan administration of this 
part; and avoid actions that may 
erode public confidence in the 
system of representative 
government.10 
 
Lawmakers left the restriction in Section 1513 intact, changing 
instead the focus of the statement of legislative intent from 
“large contributions” to “all types of political contributions.”  
That language remains today. 
 
B. 
Applicability.  Deon is a shareholder of Sands 
Pennsylvania Inc., and it owns 90 percent of privately held 
Sands Bethworks Gaming LLC (“Sands”).  Section 1513 
imposes political contribution restrictions on an array of people 
and entities with financial interests in gaming industry 
operations.11  The portion of Section 1513 relevant to Deon is 
 
10 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1102 (amended 2010, Jan. 7, P.L. 1, No. 
1, § 1, imd.) (emphases added). 
11 § 1513(a). 
11 
 
the application of the restriction to a “licensed principal . . . of 
a slot machine licensee.”12  The term “principal”13 is defined 
as “[a]n officer; director; person who directly holds a beneficial 
interest in or ownership of the securities of an applicant or 
licensee; person who has a controlling interest in an applicant 
or licensee, or has the ability to elect a majority of the board of 
directors of a licensee or to otherwise control a licensee. . . .”14  
Sands has held a “Category 2” slot machine license since 
2005.15  Deon has a “controlling interest” in Sands under the 
Act and has been licensed as a principal since it obtained its 
license. 
 
As for Hardy, Section 1325(d)(1) of the Gaming Act 
states the following:  “No trust or similar business entity shall 
be eligible to hold any beneficial interest in a licensed entity 
under this part unless each trustee, grantor and beneficiary of 
the trust, including a minor child beneficiary, qualifies for and 
is granted a license as a principal.”16  Hardy is the beneficiary 
of a trust that owns Nemacolin Woodlands, Inc.  
(“Nemacolin”)  Nemacolin owns the privately held Woodlands 
 
12 Id.  
13 Consistent with the District Court we refer to Deon and 
Hardy as “principals” and not “key employee qualifier,” a title 
previously used in reference to them.  See Deon, 341 F. Supp. 
3d at 440 n. 1 (citing 2006 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2006-135 (S.B. 
862) (Nov. 1, 2006); 37 Pa. Bull. 2808 (June 23, 2007)). 
14 § 1103. 
15 A Category 2 license authorizes operation of slot machines 
in a stand-alone facility.      § 1513(a)(2); see Riverwalk Casino, 
LP v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Bd., 926 A.2d 926, 930 
(Pa. 2007). 
16 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1325(d)(1). 
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Fayette, LLC. which has a “Category 3” slot machine license.17  
Hardy has been licensed as a principal since the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court confirmed approval of Nemacolin’s license.  
No one disputes that Section 1513 applies to either Deon or 
Hardy.   
 
C. 
The Constitutional Harm.  Deon and Hardy claim the 
Section 1513 restriction on political contributions significantly 
infringes on their political speech.  Deon portrays himself as a 
politically engaged citizen and says he regularly contributed to 
candidates from 1978 until the Gaming Act in 2004 became 
law, preventing him from continuing to do so.18  Similarly, 
Hardy made political contributions up through the time she 
obtained a Gaming Act license.  She has made none since then.  
If either violates Section 1513 they can be charged with a third-
degree misdemeanor, causing a fine of no less than $100,000 
and a suspension of their license.  The suspension lengthens 
with each violation up to and revocation of the license.19 
 
Because of this Deon and Hardy requested declaratory 
and injunctive relief. They say Section 1513 infringes their 
associational rights (and the right of similarly situated gaming-
 
17 A Category 3 license authorizes operation of slot machines 
in a hotel or resort.  § 1513(a)(5); see Riverwalk Casino, LP., 
926 A.2d at 930. 
18 Deon made a political contribution in 2009, after the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court enjoined § 1513.  He has made 
no contributions since the Commonwealth amended the 
Gaming Act in 2010. 
19 § 1513(c). 
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license applicants, licensees and principles of licensees), 
protected by the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.20  They also claim that Section 1513 violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.21  The 
District Court granted summary judgment in their favor on the 
First Amendment claim, enjoining Section 1513. 
 
II. 
   A.22 
Participating in the election of our governmental 
representatives is the essence of our democracy, and so 
political expression enjoys broad protection under the First 
Amendment “to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people.”23  The protection of free expression through 
speech and political association under the First Amendment 
extends to “[s]pending for political ends and contributing to 
 
20 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
21 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
22 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review 
orders granting summary judgment de novo.  Adams Outdoor 
Advert. Ltd. P’ship by Adams Outdoor GP, LLC v. 
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Transp., 930 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 
2019).  As for the injunction, we review the District Court’s 
“fashioning of a remedy according to an abuse of discretion 
standard.”  Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 159 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
23 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (quoting Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
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political candidates.”24  As a result, when government restricts 
political contributions to fulfill another obligation—in this 
case, its sacred duty to protect our democratic institutions from 
corruption—it has a corresponding burden to prove the 
constitutionality of those measures.25  But there are some 
distinctions. 
 
Limitations on campaign expenditures are subject to 
strict scrutiny—meaning the government must prove that the 
regulations promote a “compelling interest” and are the “least 
restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”26  But 
restricting a person’s contributions to a candidate or political 
committee “impose[s] a lesser restraint on political speech.”27  
“Contributions lie closer to the edges than to the core of 
political expression.”28  As a result, we apply intermediate 
scrutiny to political contribution restrictions:  a “lesser but ‘still 
rigorous standard of review.’”29  With that said, “[e]ven a 
‘significant interference with protected rights of political 
association’ may be sustained if the State demonstrates a 
 
24 Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Colorado Republican Fed. 
Campaign Comm’n., 533 U.S. 431, 440 (2001). 
25 See McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 210. 
26 Id. at 197. 
27 Id. 
28 Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 
(2003). 
29 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 197 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
29).  But see Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 147-48 (“[R]estrictions on 
political contributions have long been treated as marginal 
speech restrictions subject to relatively complaisant First 
Amendment review.”); see also Corren v. Condos, 898 F.3d 
209, 222–23 (2d Cir. 2018). 
15 
 
sufficiently important interest and employs means closely 
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational 




Traditionally, courts have “not second-guess[ed] a 
legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic 
measures where corruption is the evil feared.”31  It was over 
forty years ago that the Buckley court examined restrictions on 
large political contributions in the Federal Election Campaign 
Act (FECA)32 and held this is “the narrow aspect of political 
association where the actuality and potential for corruption 
have been identified.”33  Buckley’s finding—that the threat 
posed by corrupt political contributions was “not an illusory 
one”34—has endured.  Twenty years after Buckley the Court 
said that lawmakers’ suspicions about corrupt intent behind 
 
30 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (quoting, Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 
U.S. 477, 488 (1975) (internal quotation marks excluded)); see 
also McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 197. 
31 Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Nat’l. Right to Work Comm., 459 
U.S. 197, 210 (1982). 
32 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-126. 
33 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.  The Court reflected on the “deeply 
disturbing examples” of political campaign corruption, 
detailed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
that surfaced after the 1972 election.  Id. at 27.  And it decided 
from this that “the weighty interests served by restricting the 
size of financial contributions to political candidates are 
sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment 
freedoms caused by the . . . contribution ceiling.”  Id. at 29. 
34 Id. at 27. 
16 
 
large political contributions “is neither novel nor 
implausible.”35  More recently, the Court rejected aggregate 
contribution limits in FECA36 but noted:  FECA’s “base limits 
. . . [serve] the permissible objective of combatting 
corruption.”37 
 
But though the path blazed by Buckley legitimizing 
these restrictions is long, it is not very broad.  The only anti-
corruption interest identified by the Court thus far as sufficient 
to justify political contributions restrictions is the fight against 
financial quid pro quo—“dollars for political favors”—or the 
public perception of it.38  Buckley does not extend to 
restrictions that just “limit the appearance of mere influence or 
access.”39  So when a restriction on political contributions 
enacted to fight corruption is challenged, part of the 
government’s burden to justify the law is to show that it 
 
35 Shrink Missouri Gov’t. PAC, 528 U.S. at 391.  To the extent 
that Shrink Missouri refers to influence-based corruption, it is 
no longer good law.  See SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n., 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
36 52 U.S.C. § 30117(a)(1) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(1)). 
37 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 192.  “[B]ase limits [restrict] how 
much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate 
or committee.”  Id. (citing § 441(a)(1)). 
38 See id. at 192 (quoting Fed. Election Commn. v. Nat’l. 
Conservative Political Action Comm’n., 470 U.S. 480, 497 
(1985)); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn., 558 U.S. 
310, 359 (2010) (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently 
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro 
quo corruption.”).  
39 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 208. 
17 
 
addresses quid pro quo corruption, or the appearance of it.40  
And it must do so with more than “mere conjecture.”41   
 
The Commonwealth argues that Section 1513 is 
designed to address quid pro quo corruption.  But we need not 
decide whether it has shown this sufficiently important interest 
because, even if it has, we conclude that Section 1513 is not 
closely drawn to achieve that interest.   
 
C. 
While recognizing that combatting corruption is a 
sufficiently important interest, the District Court aptly said that 
this interest “does not license the legislature to enact any 
palliative measure, regardless of its restrictiveness.”42  “[A] 
statute that seeks to regulate campaign contributions could 
itself prove an obstacle to the very electoral fairness it seeks to 
promote.”43  Thus, courts have to “exercise . . . independent 
judicial judgment” when “danger signs” arise that a restriction 
reaches an “outer limit[].”44  In such cases we “must review the 
record independently and carefully with an eye toward 
assessing the statute’s ‘tailoring.’”45   
 
 
40  See Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391–92; see also Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 359. 
41 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 210 (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 
U.S. at 392). 
42 Deon, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 451. 





The parties dispute whether strict or intermediate 
scrutiny applies here.  But even if we apply a “lesser but still 
‘rigorous’”46 intermediate threshold by examining whether the 
statute is “closely drawn” the Commonwealth still does not 
meet its burden.  Under that standard, the law need not be the 
least restrictive means available.47  We ask, instead, whether 
the government has made its case that the scope of the 
provision is “‘in proportion to the interest served.’”48  “Fit 
matters.”49 
 
The McCutcheon court examined assertions that 
aggregate contribution limits were necessary to prevent 
circumvention of base limits.  In its analysis of “fit” it said the 
following: 
 
[T]he cited sources do not provide 
any real-world examples of 
circumvention of the base limits 
along the lines of the various 
hypotheticals. The dearth of FEC 
 
46 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 197 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
29). 
47 See McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 218. 
48 Id. at 218 (quoting Board of Trs of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 
492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) and In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 
(1982)); see Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (“[A] fit that is not 
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not 
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is 
‘in proportion to the interest served,’ ... that employs not 
necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly 
tailored to achieve the desired objective.”). 
49 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 218. 
19 
 
prosecutions, according to the 
dissent, proves only that people are 
getting away with it. And the 
violations that surely must be out 
there elude detection “because in 
the real world, the methods of 
achieving circumvention are more 
subtle and more complex” than the 
hypothetical examples. This sort of 
speculation, however, cannot 
justify the substantial intrusion on 
First Amendment rights at issue in 
this case.50 
 
From this it concluded:   
Based on what we can discern 
from experience, the 
indiscriminate ban on all 
contributions above the aggregate 
limits is disproportionate to the 
Government’s interest in 
preventing circumvention. The 
Government has not given us any 
reason to believe that parties or 
candidates would dramatically 
shift their priorities if the 
aggregate limits were lifted.”51 
 
 
50 Id. at 217–18. 
51 Id. at 220.   
20 
 
The phrases “real-world” and “[b]ased on what we can discern 
from experience” provide a window into the nature of this step 
in the analysis.  The government cannot meet its burden at 
either step by asserting mere conjecture.  But the Court in 
McCutcheon demonstrated a strong interest in linking, at this 
second step, the law under review to the practical 
circumstances it is designed to impact.  For that reason, we are 
assessing “fit” here by taking a much closer look at Section 
1513 in the context of the “real world” that it addresses. 
 
The Court noted in Randall that “[a]s compared with . . 
. contribution limits upheld by the Court in the past, and with 
those in force in other States, [the Act’s political contribution] 
limits are sufficiently low as to generate suspicion that they are 
not closely drawn.”52  Notably, the breadth of the prohibition 
imposed here goes far beyond that considered in Randall.  
Section 1513 imposes a flat ban on all types of contributions, 
no matter how small.  It forbids any form of contribution, not 
just money, but also contracts, loans, or “any valuable thing.”53  
And it has no de minimis threshold for contribution amount. 
Unlike in Buckley, contributors in the Commonwealth cannot 
make even symbolic expressions of support “through a small 
contribution” under Section 1513.54  Moreover, the ban applies 
to all beneficiaries of a trust that holds “any beneficial interest” 
in a gaming licensee.55 As the District Court noted “a 
contribution of a single dollar from the beneficiary of a trust 
that owns a minority stake in a holding company that, in turn, 
owns a gaming licensee” is prevented under Section 1513.  The 
 
52 Id. 
53 4 Cons. Stat § 1513(a). 
54 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24.   
55 4 Pa. Cons. Stat §1325(d)(1). 
21 
 
same is true for banks that underwrite licensees and out-of-
state gaming licensees.56  Finally, the ban applies to all 
politicians, public officials, and political organizations in the 
Commonwealth.   
 
Such a far-reaching restriction may prevent political 
contributions from being a source of quid-pro-quo corruption.  
And we respect all legislative determinations on measures to 
address this critical problem.  But the burden these restrictions 
impose on First Amendment rights demands that we have some 
way to “exercise . . . independent judicial judgment” to 
determine whether Section 1513 is closely drawn to be a 
proportional response. 57   
 
The record the Commonwealth created directs us to the 
corruption memorialized in two cases from New Jersey and 
Louisiana to understand the “real world” that Section 1513 
addresses.58  The record in these cases, the Commonwealth’s 
logic goes, will inexorably lead us to the same conclusions that 
those courts reached:  that it is “necessary to distance gaming 
 
56 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1103, 1513(a)(5) and (6).   
57 Randall, 548 U.S. at 249. 
58 Petition of Soto, 565 A.2d 1088. 1093 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 
1989); Ass’n of Louisiana v. State ex rel. Foster, 820 So.2d 494 
(LA. 2002).  One indication that the history in New Jersey 
factored into the enactment of Section 1513 is that State 
Representative Schroder read a portion of the DePaul opinion 
(quoted above), which quoted Petition of Soto, into the 
legislative record as lawmakers debated the amendment to the 
Gaming Act in 2009.  Pennsylvania House Journals, 2009 Reg. 
Sess. No. 103 (10/5/2009) at 2102-03 (quoting DePaul v. 
Com., 969 A.2d at 545 and Petition of Soto, 565 A.2d at 1093). 
22 
 
interests from the ability to contribute to candidates and 
political committees which support candidates,”59 and that 
“there is no viable alternative [to restricting all political 
contributions] to prevent the appearance of, or actual, 
corruption of the political process.”60  The Commonwealth 
contends this is the inevitable upshot because gaming-industry-
related “pay for play” is a function of “human nature,”61 
making the necessity of prohibiting even de minimis 
contributions “common sense.”62  
  
There are a couple of problems with this.  The 
Commonwealth presumes that the records developed in 
Petition of Soto and State ex rel. Foster support a judgment that 
a total prohibition of political contributions is a proportional 
response.  But even if they could support it, other states with 
legalized gaming similar to Pennsylvania—beyond New 
Jersey and Louisiana—have taken a much different approach.  
The Commonwealth never addresses this. 
 
At present, a total of twenty-five states (including 
Pennsylvania) have some form of legalized commercial, non-
tribal casino gambling (including so-called “racinos” and 
riverboats).63  The District Court found in its own review, as 
 
59 State ex rel. Foster, 820 So. 2d at 508. 
60 Petition of Soto, 565 A.2d at 1098. 
61 Reply Brief p. 6. 
62 Reply Brief p. 12. 
63  See Arkansas (AR. Const. Amend. 100, §§ 1 to 11; Ark. 
Code §§ 23-113-101 to 113-604); Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 44-30-101 to 836); Delaware (Del. Code tit. 29, §§ 4801 to 
4838); Florida (Fla. Stat. §§ 849.01 to .46); Illinois (230 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. Ann. 40/1 to 40/85); Indiana (Ind. Code Ann. § 4-
23 
 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did eight years earlier, that 
bans with the scope and breadth of Section 1513 are not 
common among these states.64  We have reached the same 
conclusion.  In fact, the overwhelming majority of states with 
commercial, non-tribal casino gambling like Pennsylvania do 
not have any political contribution restrictions that apply 
specifically to gaming industry-related parties.65  In these 
 
33-10-2.1); Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. § 99F.6); Kansas (Kan. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 74-8701 to 8780); Louisiana (La. Stat. §§ 27:1 to 
:502); Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 8, §§ 1001 to 1072); Maryland 
(Md. State Gov’t Code. § 9-1A-01 to 38); Massachusetts 
(Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23K, §§ to 71; 205 Code Mass. Regs. 
108.01); Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 432.1 to 516; Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 432.207b (Repealed by P.A.2019, No. 158, § 1, 
Imd. Eff. Dec. 20, 2019));Mississippi (Miss. Code §§ 75-76-1 
to 325); Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 313.004 to 313.850); 
Nevada (Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 462 to 467); New Jersey (N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 5:12-138); New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-
2E-1 to 60-2E-62); New York (N.Y. Rac. Pari-Mut. Wag. & 
Breed. Law §§ 100 to 1410 (McKinney)); Ohio (Ohio Rev. 
Code §§ 3772.01 to 3772.99); Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 
3A, §§ 200 to 20); Pennsylvania, (4 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1101 to 
1904, § 1513); Rhode Island (42 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 42-
61-1 to 17); South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws §§ 42-7B-1 to 
42-7B-75); West Virginia (W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 29-22A-1 to 
22E). 
64 Deon, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 445 n. 2. 
65 These states do have laws applying to the general population 
that prohibit political contributions over a particular threshold.  
In our own review we found that, of the twenty-five states with 
legalized casino gambling (including racinos and riverboats), 




contributions of gaming industry-related parties.  Instead, they 
have generally applicable political contributions limits.  See 
Alabama (Ala. Code § 17-5-1 to 21 ); Colorado, (Colo. Const. 
Art. XXVIII; 8 Colo. Code Regs. § 1505-6); Delaware (Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 15, §§ 8001, 8010 and 8012); Florida (Fla. Stat. 
§§ 106.011 and 106.08); Illinois (10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-8.5); 
Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 25- 4143 and 25-4153); Maine 
(Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, § 1015); Maryland (Md. Code Ann., 
Elec. Law §§ 13-226 and 13-227); Michigan (Mich. Comp. 
Laws §§ 169.241, 169.252 and 169.254); Mississippi (Miss. 
Code Ann. §§ 23-15-1021 and 97-13-15); Missouri (Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 130.029 and 130.031); Nevada (Nev. Const. art. 2 § 10; 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 294A.100); New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 
1-19-34); New York (N.Y. Elec. Law § 14-114); Ohio (Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3517.102, 3517.104 and 3599.03); 
Oklahoma (Okla. St. Ethics Commission, Rule 2.17) Rhode 
Island (R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 17-25-10.1 and 17-25-12); South 
Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws §§ 12-27-7 and 12-27-8); West 
Virginia (W. Va. Code §§ 3-8-5c, 3-8-8 – 3-8-12).  The 
remaining six states (Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania) impose political contribution 
bans on gaming industry-related parties.  But just three of these 
states (Louisiana, Massachusetts and New Jersey) have 
implemented a ban of comparable scope to Pennsylvania.  
Iowa restricts “qualified sponsoring” organizations from 
making contributions, (Iowa Code Ann. § 99F.6).  Indiana 
imposes a ban on a “licensee or a person with an interest in a 
licensee” from contributing to “a member of a precinct 
committee” to induce the member of the precinct committee to 
do any act or refrain from doing any act with respect to the 
approval of a local public question under IC 4-33-6-19 or IC 4-
25 
 
nineteen states, even accounting for political contribution laws 
that apply to their entire populations,66 none ban all political 
contributions by such parties.  This fatally undermines the 
Commonwealth’s central premise that the nature of gaming-
industry-related corruption creates a “common sense” need to 
adopt measures of the breadth of Section 1513.  This is the 
result because, even if we assume arguendo that findings like 
those in Petition of Soto and/or State ex rel. Foster could 
support a judgment that Section 1513 is closely drawn, the 
Commonwealth would need to show far more than it has done 
here to meet its burden. 
 
These nineteen states, combined with the 
Commonwealth, create a tautology:  all things being equal, 
allowing some political contribution (even a symbolic de 
minimis one) is less burdensome on First Amendment rights 
than allowing no political contribution at all.  And although the 
Commonwealth need not adopt the least restrictive means to 
address gaming-related corruption, it must prove that it has 
created a proportional, closely drawn scheme to address the 
issue.   
 
Perhaps the Commonwealth is accurately asserting that, 
like New Jersey and Louisiana, the presence of the gaming 
industry within its borders creates the need for a law with the 
breadth of Section 1513.  But the inescapable fact here is that 
the experience of nineteen other states with commercial, non-
tribal casinos has not generated a similar legislative judgment.  
And because these schemes place less of a burden on First 
 
33-6-19.3.” Ind. Code Ann. § 4-33-10-2.5.  These bans are 




Amendment rights, the Commonwealth—at a minimum—had 
the burden of showing why the experiences of New Jersey and 
Louisiana provide a better basis to assess the proportionality of 
Section 1513 than one of these other states.  It relies on the 
histories and legislative judgments of two states with similar 
laws to make its case here.  But it does so without reference to 
states that have taken different approaches less burdensome to 
First Amendment rights.  
  
The Commonwealth’s implicit appeal to “common 
sense” as a surrogate for evidence in support of its far-reaching 
regulatory scheme is noteworthy in this evidence-based 
inquiry, particularly in light of the approach taken by most 
other similarly situated states.  Our assessment of fit is 
meaningless unless we can be sure that it is fixed to a 
reasonable understanding of the real world that Pennsylvania 
faces.  Ultimately, this dearth of evidence is why the 
Commonwealth falls well short of its burden to show that 
Section 1513 is closely drawn.  Like the District Court, we do 
not conclude that it is impossible for the Commonwealth to 
defend the proportionality of its law.  We only conclude that it 
has failed to give us enough information to assess it here.  This 
failure is dispositive.67 
 
D. 
For all of these reasons we conclude that the 
Commonwealth has not met its burden of proving that Section 
 
67 Deon and Hardy also claim that Section 1513 
unconstitutionally bans contributions to independent 
expenditure groups.  As we conclude that the law is 
unconstitutional on other grounds, we do not reach this issue. 
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1513 is a closely drawn, proportional response consistent with 
an important anti-corruption interest.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the order of the District Court.   
